

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT

ENDC/PV.293
14 March 1967
ENGLISH

THE UNIVERSITY
OF MICHIGAN

FEB 16 1968

DOCUMENT
COLLECTION

FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE TWO HUNDRED AND NINETY-THIRD MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 14 March 1967, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. E. L. M. BURNS

(Canada)

GE.67-4737
67-08351

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. A. F. AZEREDO da SILVEIRA

Mr. D. SILVEIRA da MOTA

Mr. A. da COSTA GUIMARAES

Mr. S. de QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria:

Mr. K. CHRISTOV

Mr. B. KONSTANTINOV

Mr. T. DAMIANOV

Mr. D. KOSTOV

Burma:

U MAUNG MAUNG

U KYAW MIN

Canada:

Mr. E. L. M. BURNS

Mr. S. F. RAE

Mr. C. J. WEBSTER

Mr. C. J. MARSHALL

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. P. WINKLER

Mr. T. LAHODA

Mr. V. VAJNAR

Ethiopia:

Mr. A. ZELLEKE

Mr. B. ASSFAW

India:

Mr. V. C. TRIVEDI

Mr. K. P. JAIN

Italy:

Mr. G. P. TOZZOLI

Mr. E. FRANCO

Mr. F. SORO

Mr. G. de MICHELIS

Mexico:

Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES

Mr. M. TELLO MACIAS

Nigeria:

ALHAJI SULE KOLO

Mr. B. O. TONWE

Poland:

Mr. M. BLUSZTAJN

Mr. J. GOLDBLAT

Mr. E. STANIEWSKI

Romania:

Mr. N. ECOBESCO

Mr. O. IONESCO

Mr. A. COROIANU

Mr. C. MITRAN

Sweden:

Mrs. A. MYRDAL

Mr. A. EDELSTAM

Mr. T. WULFF

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. A. A. ROSHCHIN

Mr. O. A. GRINEVSKY

Mr. I. I. CHEPROV

Mr. V. B. TOULENOV

United Arab Republic:

Mr. H. KHALLAF

Mr. A. A. SALAM

Mr. M. SHAKER

United Kingdom:

Mr. B. J. GARNETT

Mr. R. I. T. CROMARTIE

Mr. M. R. MORLAND

United States of America:

Mr. W. C. FOSTER

Mr. S. DE PALMA

Mr. G. BUNN

Mr. C. G. BREAN

Special Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. D. PROTITCH

Deputy Special Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

1. The CHAIRMAN (Canada): I declare open the 293rd plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.
2. I have a brief statement to make as the representative of Canada; but first of all I should like to welcome on behalf of the Committee Ambassador U Maung Maung, head of the delegation of Burma, whom we are very happy to have with us. We hope that he will join in our debates and help us to make the progress which we are all wishing for.
3. Mrs. Myrdal and Gentlemen: as many of you will recall, this is the fifth anniversary of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee's first meeting in Geneva, which took place on 14 March 1962. I hope my colleagues will not think it inappropriate for me to make a few remarks in a reminiscent vein on this occasion. I have been reviewing, as perhaps many of you also have, the hopes and intentions which were expressed at that meeting, and at the several meetings which followed. We have to admit that what has been accomplished in the five years which have elapsed since is only a very small part of what we hoped for when we first met. However, certain agreements have been brought about and, even if they do not seem very significant in the light of the magnitude of the task of achieving general and complete disarmament, they do give us some encouragement. I think we all hope that the relatively small advances made so far will lead to others which will be more important.
4. I believe the best way to make the comparisons between aspirations and achievement will be to quote a few passages from the statements made during the first meetings. On some of these passages I shall add a comment, while others speak for themselves.
5. Mr. Khrushchev, who was then Chairman of the Soviet Union Council of Ministers, had proposed that, to get the Conference off to a good start, heads of government should attend. However, the governments of other participants were more reserved, and most delegations here were led by Foreign Ministers. Those of Burma, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, Italy, Nigeria, Poland, Romania, the United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union were present. Bulgaria, India, Mexico and Sweden were represented by officials -- including Mrs. Myrdal -- who, though not Foreign Ministers, were of comparable distinction.
6. I should like now to give a roll-call of the names of those who were present at that first meeting -- those who were then occupying seats at the table and who still are occupying them. If I omit the names of any who were not listed in the verbatim

(The Chairman, Canada)

record of that date as sitting at the table but who were also present, I apologize. Those listed were the following: Ambassador Christov, Ambassador Cavalletti, Mrs. Myrdal, Ambassador Foster and myself. Mr. Epstein was in the same chair he now occupies.

7. The first meeting was concerned only with procedural matters. The procedure which we adopted then, and which had previously been worked out by the co-Chairmen, is practically that which we are now following.

8. At the second meeting there were speeches on substantive matters by the chief representative of the Soviet Union, Foreign Minister Gromyko, and by the chief representative of the United States of America, Secretary of State Rusk.

9. Mr. Gromyko, after referring to the initiative of the then Chairman of the Soviet Union Council of Ministers, Mr. Khrushchev, in bringing the concept of general and complete disarmament to the United Nations in 1959, went on to say:

"Never before has there been a negotiating body for disarmament that was so fitted for the solution of the problem confronting it. The Committee is broad enough to be representative in the full sense of the word. At the same time it is narrow enough to act efficiently without getting stuck in the quagmire of endless discussions in which the vital cause of disarmament would be bogged down."

(ENDC/PV.2, p.6)

I wonder whether Mr. Gromyko would wish to amend those words today.

10. He went on to refer to the fact that nuclear tests were continuing in the atmosphere, and said that the Soviet Union was ready to discontinue them. He also mentioned that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics had submitted a draft treaty on "general and complete disarmament under strict international control" (ENDC/2) and gave a brief review of its scope and main characteristics.

11. Another quotation I have from Mr. Gromyko's speech is:

"While the Soviet Government regards the preparation of an agreement on general and complete disarmament as the Committee's main task it would nevertheless consider it useful if a number of measures which would facilitate the relaxation of international tension, the strengthening of confidence among States and the creation of more favourable conditions for disarmament were taken forthwith, without awaiting the completion of the negotiations on general and complete disarmament." (ENDC/PV.2, p.12)

(The Chairman, Canada)

12. I now turn to what Mr. Rusk, for the United States, had to say at the same meeting. My first quotation is:

"Our objective, therefore, is clear enough. We must eliminate the instruments of destruction. We must prevent the outbreak of war by accident or by design. We must create the conditions for a secure and peaceful world. In so doing, we can turn the momentum of science exclusively to peaceful purposes, and we can lift the burden of the arms race and thus increase our capacity to raise living standards everywhere." (*ibid.*, p.17)

13. Mr. Rusk also mentioned the advantage our Conference had over disarmament conferences which had preceded it, in the following terms:

"For the first time, a disarmament conference is beginning its activities within an agreed framework -- the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles^{1/} -- which all our governments have welcomed along with every other Member of the United Nations. The United States considers the Joint Statement as its point of departure. Our objective is to build on that foundation and to give practical application to the principles." (*ibid.*, p.19)

14. The next quotation I should like to read to the Committee is from the statement made by Mr. de San Thiago Dantas, Foreign Minister of Brazil, at the meeting on 16 March 1962. He said:

"We are able to state that in our opinion there should be no insurmountable obstacles to the achievement of prompt and positive results on the suspension of nuclear tests.

"The technicians of the nations most advanced in nuclear science are, I believe, agreed on the possibility of effective control of tests under water, in the atmosphere and in the biosphere, without more thorough on-site inspections and checks being necessary. We therefore consider that these tests should be suspended immediately. As regards underground tests, studies should be undertaken without delay to determine the minimum degree of on-site inspection that is essential to ensure that the undertakings given are being fulfilled."

(*ENDC/PV.3, p.9*)

15. The first and major part of the hopes which Mr. de San Thiago Dantas expressed has been fulfilled as the first real accomplishment in the disarmament field (*ENDC/100/Rev.1*). The suggestion in his last sentence has yet to be adopted, although it has been repeated many times.

(The Chairman, Canada)

16. I shall not weary the Committee with quotations from the other important speeches made during the first few meetings, but I hope it will not feel that I am abusing my position as Chairman if I close by quoting a couple of points which Mr. Howard Green, then Secretary of State for External Affairs of Canada, made at the meeting on 19 March 1962:

"I have suggested that we should begin our work with an examination of areas in which rapid agreement might be achieved. There are several examples which could be cited. ...

"The first example: The United States and Soviet proposals both provide for means of ensuring that rockets and satellites placed in orbit or launched into outer space will be used for peaceful purposes only. Provision is also made for advance notification to an international disarmament organization about all such launchings. Both sides have an overriding interest in reaching an understanding which will ensure that scientific advances in this field serve only the cause of peace. There is therefore every reason why agreement should be reached in short order."

(ENDC/PV.4, pp.14/15)

I am skipping three of Mr. Green's examples and now come to the fifth, as follows:

"... Both plans contain proposals designed to prohibit the wider spread of nuclear weapons. A resolution submitted by Ireland calling for international agreement in this field was endorsed by all the Members of the United Nations at the sixteenth session of the General Assembly, just a few months ago. What is required now is early action to bring this recommendation into force." (ibid., p.42)

17. Mr. Green included in his list seven examples where the positions set out in the Soviet Union draft treaty of general and complete disarmament (ENDC/2) and in the programme of the United States for general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world (ENDC/6) seemed sufficiently close to justify hope that the differences could be negotiated away. Of the two examples I have quoted, one has resulted in agreement (A/RES/2222(XXI)), the other is what we are hopefully waiting to consummate.

18. I shall now read, as my closing quotation, another passage from Mr. Gromyko's speech at our meeting on 15 March 1962, expressed in a somewhat poetic vein. It ran as follows:

(The Chairman, Canada)

"On fine days, the snow-capped peak of Mont Blanc can be seen from Geneva. For a long time people thought it would remain unconquered. Yet the attack on that summit continued, and it was conquered. If disarmament is tackled properly, then that summit too, on which the aspirations of the peoples have been centred for ages, can be conquered in four years." (ENDC/PV.2, p.10)

19. Well, on fine days we still see Mont Blanc, and some of us, in our more hopeful moments, feel that some day we shall finish the long and arduous climb towards general disarmament and a peaceful world. Continuing Mr. Gronyko's metaphor, we might say we have reached one stage beyond the base camp and we see another camp -- non-proliferation -- not far away. It is for all of us to push on with courage, determination and enthusiasm to this next staging point.

20. Mr. Azeredo da SILVEIRA (Brazil): A series of resolutions (ENDC/185) adopted by the twenty-first session of the General Assembly make up the agenda of our current session. Those resolutions pertain to a number of issues which fall under the heading of disarmament, and spell out what the United Nations wishes the Eighteen-Nation Committee to do here at this time. Unequivocal stress is placed on the question of signing a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons: appearing in more than one resolution, this question provides the dominant theme of the deliberations in New York.

21. It is significant that the General Assembly recommendations were in almost all cases carried by an overwhelming majority of votes. To our mind, this quasi-unanimity is a token of the by now very clear and very deep awareness of the international community of the problems to be tackled and of the measures to be taken with a view to halting the nuclear arms race and paving the way to general and complete disarmament under effective international control. And it is with gratification that we note that the delegations from the group of eight nations lent their joint inspiration and endeavours to bring about the near-consensus which made possible the adoption of those decisions.

22. The atmosphere which prevailed in New York is perhaps the best answer to the qualms that periodically beset a few sectors of world public opinion with regard to the alleged sterility of the disarmament debates in Geneva. Those who allege that too often seem to forget that it is easier to watch and to criticize than to participate and to try. Indeed, we believe that the discussions held in this forum for the past

(Mr. Azeredo da Silveira, Brazil)

few years have been instrumental in clarifying and in defining the questions under our scrutiny, thereby enabling the Conference itself and the General Assembly to have a more learned, and therefore more realistic, vision of the nature and scope of the solutions to be sought.

23. The question of signing an agreement on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons comes before us again with the highest priority, amply and variously urged upon us by the General Assembly. Resolution 2153 (XXI) explicitly calls upon the Conference to give priority to this matter; resolution 2162 (XXI), concerned with the question of general and complete disarmament, makes it clear that the new efforts to be exerted by the Committee should above all concentrate on the preparation of an international treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons; resolution 2149 (XXI) urgently appeals to all States to do everything they can to facilitate the conclusion of such a treaty at the earliest possible time, and to refrain from any actions conducive to the proliferation of nuclear weapons or which might hamper the signing of the agreement. This of course does not detract from the importance of the other items on our agenda, especially the completion of the test-ban Treaty (ENDC/100/Rev.1) so that it covers underground nuclear weapon tests, an issue mentioned by the General Assembly along with that of non-proliferation. But the tenor of the resolutions and the records of the debates in New York will show that the Conference is expected to accord the matter of non-proliferation a degree of urgency somewhat higher than that accorded to the others.

24. We cannot fail to notice that the present session of the Conference will in a way resume the negotiations which have been under way for some time with a view to the preparation of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. This circumstance gives additional weight to the task we are asked to discharge. As I am sure all the other members of the Committee hope, my delegation hopes that those negotiations will yield substantial results. Brazil is willing and ready to study and discuss such results when they are submitted to the Conference by the Powers which have been taking part in those consultations. While it would, of course, be impossible for my delegation to commit itself to a course of action before the outcome of those talks is made known, there is nothing negative in our approach to them. On the contrary, it is our steadfast hope that any such results may prove acceptable to all of us here and to the world at large. It is in that spirit that we are prepared to contribute to this goal through a candid and, we trust, constructive discussion of any forthcoming draft formulations that might become the text of a treaty.

(Mr. Azeredo da Silveira, Brazil)

25. In this connexion, allow me to return briefly to Brazil's stand on the structure and contents of a treaty to halt the spread of nuclear weapons. We remain firmly convinced that an agreement to this end should take into account the principles laid down in General Assembly resolution 2028 (XX). (ENDC/161) That has been the constant view of my delegation, and only last year, speaking before the General Assembly, the Brazilian representative once more underlined our attitude towards resolution 2028 (XX) in the following words:

"All those principles are of paramount political importance and ...
no lasting agreement could be arrived at without the strictest observance
of such principles." (A/C.1/PV.1437, p.7)

26. Those principles are well known and there is no need for me to read them out. Let me just add that the Brazilian delegation, along with the seven other delegations of the group of eight, has -- and rightly so -- consistently singled out principle (b), which speaks of the "acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations of the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers"; it is in this light that we maintain that the treaty "should be coupled with or followed by tangible steps to halt the nuclear arms race and to limit, reduce and eliminate the stocks of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery" (ENDC/178, p.3). Moreover, the Conference will recall that, besides fully subscribing to the terms of the joint memoranda on non-proliferation presented by the eight nations (ENDC/158, 178), Brazil has expressed some further views on what we described as a programme of related measures which would include the treaty we are contemplating. These views were put on record by my predecessor in this seat when, on 1 March 1966, he said that --

"An objective and politically valid treaty on non-proliferation should reflect not only the reality of the power relations between the great nuclear Powers, but also the reality of the power relations between these countries and the non-nuclear world.

"In the view of the Brazilian delegation, the treaty should be conceived and outlined as part of a programme. Such a programme should be designed to bring about a first and important step towards general and complete disarmament under effective international control and, at the same time, to further the process of the social and economic development of the less-developed countries.

(Mr. Azeredo da Silveira, Brazil)

"The idea of linking the treaty to a comprehensive programme may be traced back to resolution DC/225, adopted by the Disarmament Commission on 15 June 1965. Indeed, sub-paragraph (c) of operative paragraph 2 of the resolution reads:

"'...also accord special priority to the consideration of the question of a treaty or convention to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, giving close attention to the various suggestions that agreement could be facilitated by adopting a programme of certain related measures'. (DC/225; ENDC/149)

"I am quite aware that, in view of the dramatic urgency of our task, it would not be possible to establish an immediate link between the signature of the treaty and the implementation of a programme of related measures. But if the non-nuclear Powers show their willingness, here and now, to give up the production and the use of nuclear weapons, for the benefit of mankind -- and thus for the benefit of the nuclear Powers themselves -- why, I ask myself, cannot the latter show their readiness to offer a counterpart to the signing of the treaty by the non-nuclear Powers?

"Why do not the nuclear Powers, along with the treaty, commit themselves, through a declaration of intention, to carrying out a programme based on the following points: first, to take 'tangible steps to halt the nuclear arms race and to limit, reduce and eliminate the stocks of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery' (ENDC/153); second, to stop all nuclear weapons tests -- both measures to be taken under adequate international control; third, to increase co-operation with the non-nuclear Powers with a view to accelerating their utilization of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes; and fourth, to channel to the developing countries at least part of the savings effected by the aforementioned disarmament steps?"

(ENDC/PV.244, pp. 16, 17)

27. It may be prudent to acknowledge at this point that, however far-reaching in its intentions, however positive in its language, however effective in its implementation, an agreement on non-proliferation would not furnish the world with a cure-all for its political ills. It can be assumed that when the agreement is completed it will not

(Mr. Azeredo da Silveira, Brazil)

include all the nuclear-weapon Powers. It would of course be ideally desirable that the pact be signed by all countries, nuclear and non-nuclear alike. But it appears that the goal will prove unattainable, at least in the immediate future. There are indications that in the Far East and in Europe two nuclear-weapon States do not contemplate becoming parties to such an agreement; and to the extent that they would not do so, the political and military territory covered by the agreement would be correspondingly diminished. To deplore this situation is not enough. More than that, the negotiators of the treaty must face its implications and devise ways and means to neutralize the effects of any partial failure of the "nuclear club" to come into the fold of the treaty.

28. This leads us to the question of guarantees. To our mind, the question of guarantees is essentially linked with the principle of the "acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations" (A/RES/2028(XX)). Time and again my delegation has stated that we deem it a necessity that the nuclear-weapon Powers contemplate a system of guarantees aimed at ensuring the security of the non-nuclear-weapon countries against nuclear attack or the threat thereof. The same point was pressed at our last meeting by the representative of Nigeria, Ambassador Kolo (ENDC/PV.292, para.5). By signing a non-proliferation treaty, the non-nuclear-weapon States will be surrendering the most important means they might otherwise have at their disposal to counter possible aggression. The nuclear-weapon Powers themselves are cognizant of this fact, the logic of which is the same as that underlying their own strategy of deterrence. That a future treaty on non-proliferation might not be signed by all States is a prospect which makes imperative the need for this system of guarantees.

29. Still in the light of the principle of the "acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations", let me turn now to a topic very much in the public eye and one which has often, and for some time now, been raised by my delegation in the Committee and elsewhere -- the transfer to the developing countries of nuclear technology for peaceful pursuits. It is abundantly clear that the present non-nuclear countries want to be certain that by binding themselves to the clauses of a non-proliferation treaty they will not be precluding their own access to the nuclear

(Mr. Azeredo da Silveira, Brazil)

age for purposes of peace. This concern was underlined a few days ago by the representative of Italy, Ambassador Cavalletti, whose very apt words I should like to quote:

(Spoke in French)

"Clearly it would be inadmissible for a non-proliferation treaty, through technical limitations or the unfair influence of discriminatory controls, to delay or hamper scientific, technical or social progress in non-nuclear weapon countries. Each country must remain free to develop its industrial facilities through the use of all forms of atomic energy." (ENDC/PV.289, para.20)

(Continued in English)

30. The anxiety of the non-nuclear States in this connexion reflects utterly legitimate national interests which cannot be heeded by all concerned. On this line of reasoning the world would have a lot to gain if the treaty were made to reach beyond its political boundaries and become a bold step forward and across the threshold of the utilization of nuclear energy for the promotion of social and economic progress. Peace and widespread poverty are not easily reconcilable in the long-range perspective of international affairs. Should the treaty succeed at the same time in being a true disarmament measure and in helping to bridge the gap between the wealthy and the have-nots, then it would be recorded in history as an achievement commensurate with the responsibilities falling to our generation.

31. Lest this notion be considered far-fetched or romantic, may I venture to offer some remarks by way of illustration of our thought?. We are told, for instance, that a growing number of European politicians, scientists and businessmen already begin to view with apprehension the opening up of a "technological gap" between their countries and the countries outside the area. We are not in a position to comment on this in detail. There is one question, however, which we may in all fairness ask ourselves: if responsible personalities in some of the highly-industrialized States of Europe seem to fear that, owing to a gap in technology, their economies risk falling behind -- thereby condemning them to a future role which one newspaper defined as being that of "an atomic proletariat" --, what of the genuine alarm with which the truly poor nations of the developing world look at the possibility of being permanently barred from the advantages of nuclear progress in the economic and industrial fields?

(Mr. Azeredo da Silveira, Brazil)

32. In the same context we have already heard that the less-developed nations would be the unsung victims of the end of the cold war, that the interest of the highly-industrialized Powers in assisting them in their efforts towards social and economic progress tends to diminish in proportion to the reduction of the political tensions which have prevailed since the Second World War, and that this trend is apparent in the fact that the flow of funds from the rich nations to the poor nations, which doubled between 1956 and 1961, has since remained practically unchanged. We will not subscribe to this contention, although we think it is a comment not wholly unrelated to the dangers of things to come. All the more reason, in any case, to seize the occasion provided by the negotiation and eventual adoption of a non-proliferation treaty to refute emphatically this pessimistic outlook.

33. At this point it is appropriate to mention the very significant step towards peace and disarmament taken a month ago by the countries of Latin America. My delegation listened with pleasure to the praise bestowed here upon the Treaty (ENDC/186) which prohibits nuclear weapons in that vast geographical zone, and joins the previous speakers in commending the contribution of the representative of Mexico, my close friend Ambassador Garcia Robles, to the approval of that pioneer international instrument.

34. The banning of nuclear weapons in Latin America has been a steadfast concern of my country. As early as in 1962 a proposal (A/C.1/L.312/Rev.1) to that end was submitted by Brazil to the seventeenth session of the United Nations General Assembly. That an agreement on the subject has now been concluded fills us with justified pride. The regional Treaty is indeed a milestone on the path of the negotiations towards non-proliferation of nuclear weapons on a universal scale -- a milestone which brings us nearer the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control. Today, without presuming to add to the presentation of the treaty so ably made on our opening day by Ambassador Garcia Robles (ENDC/PV.287), I should like to refer to one aspect of the agreement -- the question of peaceful nuclear explosives. My Government attaches particular importance to this question, whose bearing on the present negotiations on non-proliferation is well known. We also feel that it is opportune for us to touch on this issue, in view of the fact that a few days ago the representative of the United States, Ambassador William Foster, presented to the Conference an interpretation of that element of the Treaty which is not borne out by the text of the Treaty (ENDC/PV.291, paras. 22 et seq.)

(Mr. Azeredo da Silveira, Brazil)

35. Brazil is fully and unequivocally committed to banning nuclear weapons in its territory. At the same time, Brazil maintains with no less firmness its right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, in particular for its economic development and social progress. These two stands are embodied in the Latin American Treaty, the relevant provisions of which spell out in detail the obligations of the contracting parties with respect to the first, and explicitly acknowledge the latter. The determination of the countries of Latin America that nothing in the Treaty shall prejudice their right, as contracting parties, to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes is expressed in article 17; by the same token, article 18 permits the contracting parties to the Treaty to carry out explosions of nuclear devices for peaceful purposes -- including explosions which involve devices similar to those used in nuclear weapons -- or to collaborate with third parties for the same purpose.

36. As representatives know, this permission is accorded subject to a thorough system of control; article 18 itself and other provisions of the Treaty, particularly articles 1 and 5, establish the conditions to be fulfilled by the contracting parties to carry out such explosions, and stipulate elaborate procedures which include advance notification to the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the International Atomic Energy Agency; supply of detailed information on the planned explosion; and physical observation of the preparations and of the explosion itself by those two agencies in order to ascertain whether the device and the procedures followed during the explosion are in conformity with the Treaty.

37. As we have seen, the Treaty draws a clear-cut distinction between peaceful nuclear explosions and explosions for nuclear-weapon purposes. It leaves no room for confusion between one and the other. Peaceful nuclear explosions clearly pertain to the domain of nuclear technology for pursuits of peace, and to this extent are of interest to both developing countries and non-nuclear countries. Let me just summarize the views which my delegation has put forward on previous occasions in this connexion:

There is no difference at the present time between nuclear weapon technology and technology for peaceful purposes;

The development of research in the field of nuclear energy inevitably includes, at a certain stage, the use of explosions; to bar access to explosions would amount to hindering the development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy;

(Mr. Azeredo da Silveira, Brazil)

banning nuclear explosions would not be an absolute means of checking the spread of nuclear weapons for, at the present level of technology, nuclear weapons can be manufactured without resort to nuclear explosions;

Even after attaining capability to carry out explosions for peaceful purposes, non-nuclear weapon States would still have to take several additional steps to embark on the manufacture of nuclear weapons;

To contend that non-nuclear weapon countries ought to relinquish the possibility of developing by national means nuclear technology for peaceful purposes is, grosso modo, tantamount to requiring that peaceful countries refrain from producing conventional explosives for industrial purposes;

Peaceful nuclear explosions may provide a solution to many of the serious problems which confront Latin American countries and developing countries in general in the economic field, such as the digging of canals, the connexion of hydrographic basins, the recovery of oil fields, the release of natural gas, etc.

38. A number of recent developments contrast oddly with the auspicious atmosphere so many discern for the negotiations on non-proliferation and for the work of the Conference. My delegation has followed with concern successive items of news on the possible deployment by the super-Powers of anti-ballistic defensive systems; on the conducting of extensive series of underground tests; on the feasibility of muffling underground tests to escape detection; on new nuclear-weapon engines, such as the spectacular contraption which goes by the name of "multiple individually-targetable re-entry vehicle". And this list is by no means exhaustive. We are sorry to see that our words before this Committee in July 1966 have so soon acquired a dismal tinge of prophecy. Speaking on the prospects for an early agreement banning underground tests, we said then:

" sudden change -- a break-through on one side or on the other -- might suddenly offset the balance of wills which could have made an agreement possible. Let us suppose, for instance, that one of the super-Powers decides to embark upon the setting-up of what has been called the "anti-missile ballistic defence system" and that for that purpose it will need to carry out an extensive series of underground tests. In order to keep the present balance of power, the other super-Power will immediately embark upon the same path. Therefore the present chances of reaching an agreement on underground tests will vanish, perhaps for a long time".

(ENDC/PV.276, p.16).

(Mr. Azeredo da Silveira, Brazil)

39. We must derive what encouragement we can from the widespread feeling that nuclear developments of the kind mentioned above will be illusory as a route to security -- a feeling that should lead to the abandonment of such systems and devices. In his State of the Union Message last January, the President of the United States bore witness to this when he pointed out that "any additional race would impose on our peoples, and on all mankind for that matter, an additional waste of resources with no gain in security for either side". Thus an intensified nuclear weapon rivalry would benefit no one and bring damage to all. Besides heightening the danger of a clash through miscalculation, lifting the arms race to a new level would be likely to corrode the will of the nuclear-weapon Powers to enter into agreements, foreclosing disarmament efforts for years to come. Hence it is our duty to co-operate in this Conference to prevent a new and even more dangerous spiral of competition between the nuclear-weapon States.

40. In trying to support the cause of restraint and peace, perhaps the Conference would find it desirable to devote some of its time and attention to a suggestion Brazil put forward last year to the General Assembly on what might be called, broadly speaking, the disarmament of science. Commenting upon the revolutionary vertical proliferation -- that is, the ceaseless development of new super-weapons or systems of weapons -- the Brazilian representative in the First Committee suggested the freezing of nuclear war technology, pointing out that --

"It is a well-known fact that, in view of the very nature of modern technology, arms control agreements -- and the Moscow Test Ban Treaty^{1/} is a very good example -- can only be reached in the brief moments of evenness in the scientific search or race for new weapon developments. These moments are infrequent, as scientific advances in the highly developed industrialized societies occur in a parallel but irregular way. Thus, a halt in man's power to conceive new weapons in the long run might constitute the single most important collateral disarmament measure. The freeze on nuclear war technology would not be tantamount to a freeze in the technological revolution. On the contrary, it would entail a political decision to give new shape to the technological revolution, to transform it into a powerful instrument for political stability and for the social and economic betterment of the whole world. This prospect is clearly within our reach". (A/C.1/PV.1437, p.13).

(Mr. Azeredo da Silveira, Brazil)

Suffice it to say that the new weapon developments touched upon above strengthen the validity and the timeliness of the Brazilian suggestion on the freeze of nuclear war technology.

41. My delegation has spoken at some length today on non-proliferation because we wanted to put first things first and to reaffirm at this juncture the principles and ideas which in our opinion should orientate the Conference in discussing the question. This does not mean that we hold rigid views about the order of our work, or that we should be inclined to forgo the consideration of the other items before the Committee. When the occasion arises we will devote no less attention to the question of general and complete disarmament under effective international control and to the other collateral measures at hand. In keeping with its record in the Committee, the Brazilian delegation will continue to exert every effort to help in the common search for solutions to the disarmament problems.

42. Mr. ROSHCHIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): During the general debate in the Eighteen-Nation Committee some important problems relating to disarmament and the relaxation of international tension have been raised and many interesting observations have been made. As the exchange of views has shown, the main attention of the delegations has been devoted to the question of banning the spread of nuclear weapons. The discussion which has taken place since our Conference resumed its work has shown very convincingly that, practically speaking, the delegations of all the countries represented on our Committee agree that effective measures should be taken to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons throughout the world.

43. As the representative of Sweden, Mrs. Myrdal, said on 23 February:

"This session undoubtedly opens with great expectations that we shall reap some harvest from that spirit of co-operation which became apparent during the debate on disarmament at the General Assembly of the United Nations". (ENDC/PV.288, para.29)

44. May I also draw your attention to the remarks of the representative of Mexico, Mr. Garcia Robles, who, speaking on 21 February about the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (ENDC/186), said:

(Mr. Roshchin, USSR)

"I venture to hope that it will provide the necessary stimulus to enable this Committee successfully to conclude at this session the task which has been entrusted to it: to draft a universal treaty to prevent the dissemination of nuclear weapons in any form whatsoever" (ENDC/PV.287, para.49).

45. All the delegations that have spoken here have declared themselves in favour of the earliest possible conclusion of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and have expressed the hope that at the present time there are sufficient grounds to count on solving this topical international problem. We welcome certain changes for the better which have recently emerged in the question of non-proliferation and which bring us closer to the long-desired aim, namely to set up a barrier against the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and thereby a barrier against the growing threat of nuclear war connected with such proliferation.

46. It would be wrong, however, to overlook certain difficulties which are being created in the way of the conclusion of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons by circles that are not interested in the solution of this problem. These difficulties, which the representative of the United Kingdom, Lord Chalfont, mildly described at the 287th meeting as "public expression of doubts about adherence to a non-proliferation treaty" (ENDC/PV.287, para.84), stem mainly from West Germany.

47. Speaking at a pre-electoral meeting in Moscow on 10 March 1967, the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Mr. Brezhnev, said in regard to the conclusion of a non-proliferation treaty:

"The peoples of the world have long been awaiting this treaty, which is destined to protect the world from the further spread of nuclear weapons and thus reduce the danger of a nuclear war and help the cause of disarmament. And yet in the ruling circles of the Federal Republic of Germany, the possibility of the conclusion of such a treaty has, it seems, been interpreted as a veritable calamity and the collapse of their most cherished aspirations and hopes. From Bonn we hear all sorts of objections, pre-conditions and reservations, and manoeuvres behind the scenes have been started with the aim of creating more and more difficulties for the conclusion of such a treaty."

(Mr. Roshchin, USSR)

48. The participants in the negotiations are aware that the former West German Chancellor, Dr. Adenauer, stated to representatives of the press in Madrid on the eve of the resumption of the work of our Committee that he regarded a non-proliferation treaty as a "Morgenthau plan raised to the second power". In an interview with the Milan newspaper Corriere Della Sera, published on 10 March 1967, Dr. Adenauer said that he would never have signed a non-proliferation treaty. He declared that if the Federal Republic of Germany adhered to such a treaty it would be signing its own "death warrant".

49. The Guardian, in its issue of 10 March 1967, commenting on Dr. Adenauer's statement against a non-proliferation treaty, wrote:

"Even Adenauer has joined in this campaign of those who appear to favour the cold war and evince a certain distrust of the non-proliferation treaty largely because the Russians are in favour of it."

50. The Finance Minister of the Federal Republic of Germany, Herr Strauss, has also joined actively in the campaign against a non-proliferation treaty, emphatically opposing the conclusion of such a treaty and adherence to it by the Federal Republic of Germany, and saying that it would be a "super Versailles", thus recalling the peace treaty imposed upon Germany after the First World War. He even threatened to resign if West Germany signed the treaty. According to the London Times of 20 February 1967, he sent a sharp letter to Chancellor Kiesinger in which he described his position in regard to a non-proliferation treaty. The West Germany Finance Minister leaves no doubt at all why he is so strongly opposed to the treaty. In an interview published in Der Spiegel of 2 January 1967, Herr Strauss stated:

"I have never doubted that it would be desirable in the long run for us to join in a European atomic force." As you see, it all comes back to one and the same thing: the striving to prevent the conclusion of a non-proliferation treaty so as to leave open for West Germany the possibility of obtaining access to nuclear weapons in one form or another.

51. Along the same lines are the remarks of the president of the Federal Board of the West German Industries Union, Fritz Berg, who according to the Bild Zeitung declared before the resumption of our negotiations in Geneva: "We Germans shall be totally excluded from research, and we shall be reduced to the level of an agricultural State, of a developing country."

(Mr. Roshchin, USSR)

52. Der Stern of 5 March 1967 published an article by a West German journalist, Sebastian Haffner. In this article, which gives an idea of the atmosphere created in the Federal Republic of Germany on the subject of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, we read:

"The agitation against a non-proliferation treaty reminds us of the manner in which such campaigns were conducted in Goebbels' time. First a few individual voices take up the main theme; then more and more other instruments join in; and finally the whole orchestra plays the same theme in unison and rises to a wild, hysterical furioso: 'super Versailles', 'Diktat', 'Morgenthau plan', 'signing one's own death warrant', etc."

53. The statements in West Germany against a non-proliferation treaty along the lines of those made by Dr. Adenauer, Herr Strauss and other prominent statesmen of the Federal Republic of Germany are of course completely unjustified. It is quite obvious that the future of any country, its economic development, cannot in any way be linked with possession of nuclear weapons. The solution of the non-proliferation problem is directed against the spread of nuclear weapons and not at all against the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes.

54. On the contrary, the conclusion of an international non-proliferation treaty will enable countries which do not possess nuclear weapons to utilize to a greater extent their scientific personnel and material resources for the needs of peaceful development, whereas otherwise the scientific personnel and vast resources would be assigned to less beneficial purposes. One cannot fail to agree with the assertion of the representative of the United Kingdom, Lord Chalfont, who stated on 23 February 1967 that the conclusion of a non-proliferation treaty would not cause any harm to civil industry (ENDC/PV.288, para.14).

55. This whole campaign which is being conducted by certain circles in the Federal Republic of Germany against the non-proliferation treaty, conceals behind all the alleged concern about economic needs the well-known policy of the militarist and revanchist forces in the Federal Republic of Germany aimed at obtaining access to nuclear weapons. This campaign is in sharp contradiction with resolution 2149 adopted at the twenty-first session of the United Nations General Assembly, which appeals to all States -

(Mr. Roshchin, USSR)

"To refrain from any actions conducive to the proliferation of nuclear weapons or which might hamper the conclusion of an agreement on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons" (ENDC/185).

56. At the pre-electoral meeting on 10 March Mr. Brezhnev said:

"To those who today determine the foreign policy of the Federal Republic of Germany we should like to say quite frankly: if you wish to gain the confidence of the European peoples, and if you are indeed striving to ensure the peaceful future of your country, give up the illusion that you can speak on behalf of the whole German people, recognize the situation that has actually come about in Europe, including the fact of the existence of two German States, renounce clearly and unambiguously any claim to have access to nuclear weapons."

57. In direct contrast to the campaign carried on in the Federal Republic of Germany against a non-proliferation treaty is the attitude of the other German State - the German Democratic Republic. The statement of the Government of the German Democratic Republic addressed to the Eighteen-Nation Committee which we read out at the meeting on 7 March 1967 (ENDC/PV.291, para.6), provides convincing evidence of the German Democratic Republic's peace-loving policy and deep interest in solving the problem of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and other disarmament questions. We draw the particular attention of the participants in the negotiations to the appeal of the Government of the German Democratic Republic -

"that the Government of the West German Federal Republic should join the readiness repeatedly declared by the Government of the German Democratic Republic to accede without any conditions and reservations to a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons", (ENDC/189, p.6)

58. We should like to hope that in regard to a non-proliferation treaty there will prevail also in the Federal Republic of Germany reasonable, sound principles which will make it possible to remove the obstacles which are being placed in the way of a solution to this problem. Nuclear weapons cannot be allowed to fall into the hands of those forces that are calling for a revision of the results of the Second World War and are doing their utmost to increase tension on the continent of Europe and throughout the world.

(Mr. Roshchin, USSR)

59. In examining the question of the conclusion of a non-proliferation treaty in its correct perspective, one cannot fail to reach the conclusion that all countries are interested in solving this problem. From time to time we hear the question raised: will not the security of the non-nuclear countries suffer under such a treaty? To that question we can reply quite definitely that such a treaty will but strengthen the security of all countries without exception. In our world today the security of each individual country is inseparable from universal security, and it is precisely the solution of the problem of non-proliferation that would help to ensure international security and reduce the threat of a nuclear war. Would the appearance of new nuclear Powers, if the spread of nuclear weapons were to be allowed, strengthen world stability or be a guarantee of security? Of course not. That is precisely why we regard the problem of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons as a priority task in the disarmament negotiations. The lack of a solution to this problem will lead to an increase in the number of nuclear Powers and create such a situation in the world that the threat to universal security will be many times greater.

60. A treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons will undoubtedly be in the interests of all countries, nuclear and non-nuclear, because it will create a more reliable degree of universal security and lead to an easing of international tension and a strengthening of confidence among States.

61. Likewise we often hear the question raised of how to reconcile the solution of the problem of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons with the use of nuclear explosions by non-nuclear Powers for peaceful purposes. Strictly speaking, at the present stage the question of the use of peaceful nuclear explosions is not a practical issue, and, according to available information, it is hardly likely to be of any great practical importance in the foreseeable future. The problem of the use of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes is being intensively spread abroad by the very same circles in West Germany that would like to discover new obstacles to the conclusion of a non-proliferation treaty.

62. It is known that a device for carrying out nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes is no different in principle from devices serving a military purpose. Therefore our attitude to the carrying-out of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes by non-nuclear countries is determined by our position of principle in regard to

(Mr. Roshchin, USSR)

non-proliferation in general and, above all, by the premise that a treaty on this question must close all loopholes for the proliferation of nuclear weapons in any form. Such a position is fully in keeping with the well-known resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly adopted unanimously at its last session (ENDC/185).

63. The Soviet Union understands the interest of the non-nuclear countries in the use of nuclear energy in the future for implementing such major projects in the field of economic development as may require the carrying-out of nuclear explosions. We firmly maintain the position that an agreement on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons cannot and should not prevent non-nuclear countries from using nuclear energy for the purposes of peaceful economic development. In doing so we bear in mind that the question of the procedure and conditions governing the carrying-out of nuclear explosions is a separate question that can be settled only on the basis of a separate international agreement.

64. We are firmly convinced that the solution of the problem of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons would correspond to the interests of all peoples and all States, whether nuclear or non-nuclear. Of course it would be a good thing to carry out immediately a complete programme of nuclear disarmament or, better still, to solve the problem of general and complete disarmament. The Soviet Union is a consistent advocate of the solution of these questions and has repeatedly made appropriate proposals in this regard. The participants in the negotiations should be well aware that it is not through our fault that these problems have not so far been solved.

65. But would it be right to put off the drafting and conclusion of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, where there are prospects of success, on the pretext that it is necessary to reach agreement simultaneously on steps in the direction of eliminating the nuclear potential of the nuclear Powers? Obviously the path indicated by the United Nations General Assembly is the right one and offers the best chance of solving the questions before the Committee. The participants in the negotiations know that paragraph 6 of resolution 2153 adopted at the 21st session of the United Nations General Assembly -

"Calls upon the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to give high priority to the question of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in accordance with the mandate contained in General Assembly resolution 2028 (XX);" (ENDC/185)

(Mr. Roshchin, USSR)

66. It is altogether obvious that the conclusion of a non-proliferation treaty will create favourable conditions for progress in the solution of other disarmament questions. The Soviet delegation has repeatedly stressed that it regards the solution of the problem of non-proliferation not as an end in itself or a single isolated measure, but as a link in a chain of other disarmament measures leading to the elimination of the threat of a nuclear war. The Soviet Union bases itself on the promise that the solution of the problem of non-proliferation will help towards reaching agreement also on other questions in the field of nuclear disarmament. Our task consists, not in perpetuating indefinitely the existing number of members of the "nuclear club", but in eliminating that club altogether, by banning and ultimately by destroying nuclear weapons.

67. In concluding this examination of the question of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, I should like once more to emphasize that the Soviet Union stands wholeheartedly for a positive solution of the problem of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union considers in this connexion that the conclusion of an appropriate treaty is an important pressing task of our time.

68. In the course of the general debate one other important question has been touched on, or rather a group of questions, the solution of which would help to strengthen security and to relax international tension: I refer to the problem of establishing denuclearized zones in various parts of the world. This problem has long been ripe for solution. The vital significance and importance of proposals for the establishment of denuclearized zones are confirmed by the example of a number of Latin-American countries, whose efforts for the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America have resulted in the elaboration and signing of an appropriate Treaty. The members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee are no doubt studying with great interest this important document, namely the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (ENDC/186).

69. The representative of Mexico, Mr. Garcia Robles, whose contribution to the drafting of the Latin-American Treaty is well known, has commented to us upon some of what he called its major provisions (ENDC/PV.287), and the Soviet delegation attached great importance to the analysis that he made. We noted in particular the

(Mr. Roshchin, USSR)

remarks of the representative of Mexico concerning nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes (*ibid.*, paras. 64 et seq.), and also the statement made by the representative of the United States, Mr. Foster, on this same question on 7 March (ENDC/PV.291). We listened with great interest to their interpretation of article 18 on explosions for peaceful purposes, in relation to the organic link between this article and the provisions of articles 1 and 5, which forbid "The testing, use, manufacture, production or acquisition by any means whatsoever" (ENDC/186) of any device which is capable of releasing nuclear energy in an uncontrolled manner, and also "The receipt, storage, installation, deployment and any form of possession" of such a device.

70. The connexion between the aforesaid provisions of the Latin American Treaty has the significance that devices for the carrying-out of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, as I have already stated, are no different in principle from the devices used in nuclear weapons. This circumstance closely links the question of the use of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes with the question of preventing the further proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, so we understand, is to be directed against such proliferation.

71. We have also heard today an interpretation of article 18 of the Treaty by the representative of Brazil (*Supra*, para. 36). We shall examine this interpretation with the attention that this question merits. We shall make our comments in this connexion, if the need arises, at one of the later meetings of the Committee.

72. The position of principle of the Soviet Union is to support the establishment of denuclearized zones in various parts of the world. The Soviet Government has, as you know, repeatedly expressed its readiness to undertake to respect the status of denuclearized zones, provided that the other nuclear Powers will enter into similar undertakings. Obviously a more specific attitude towards any particular denuclearized zone can be stated after studying the agreement concluded by the respective countries for the establishment of such a zone, and taking into consideration the positions of the other nuclear Powers.

73. The participants in the negotiations are no doubt well acquainted with the proposals for the establishment of nuclear-free zones in Central Europe, the Mediterranean Basin, the Balkan Peninsula and Adriatic region, Scandinavia, the Near

(Mr. Roshchin, USSR)

and Middle East, the Pacific Basin and elsewhere. We all know the Declaration turning Africa into a denuclearized zone that was adopted at the twentieth session of the United Nations General Assembly (A/RES/2033(XX); ENDC/162). In the present circumstances, when we are witnessing practical progress in establishing denuclearized zones, it would be extremely desirable that the countries concerned should without undue delay start negotiations with a view to carrying out this idea in specific regions and succeed in giving practical effect to the existing proposals.

74. In our opinion -- and this point of view is shared by many Powers -- it would be particularly important to establish a denuclearized zone in Central Europe, the area of the greatest tension in the European continent. It is there that the armed forces of the NATO Powers and the Warsaw Treaty Powers confront one another; it is there that colossal stocks of nuclear weapons and missiles are concentrated. As reported in the United States press, there are now more than 7,000 nuclear warheads in Western Europe. The Soviet Government considers that the implementation of the proposal of the Polish People's Republic for the establishment in Central Europe of a zone free of nuclear weapons and missiles (ENDC/C.1/1) would be of great importance for the relaxation of international tension and the establishment of security in Europe. We also whole-heartedly support the Polish proposal on the freezing of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons in this region (ENDC/PV.189, p.6). An important contribution to the cause of disarmament and the relaxation of international tension would be made by implementing the proposals of the German Democratic Republic contained in the Statement of the Government of the German Democratic Republic set out in Committee document ENDC/189.

75. Before concluding our statement we should like to mention the question which you, Mr. Chairman, raised today in your statement. Five years have elapsed since the Committee first met to occupy itself with the solution of one of the most important or international problems of these times, the problem of halting the arms race and or bringing about general and complete disarmament. In assessing the work of the Committee in the intervening period, we should like to note that the negotiations on disarmament have not been a waste of time. During the discussions that have taken place, however, heated they may have been at times, the positions of the sides have been made clear and there has been a search for agreement on the questions under consideration by the Eighteen-Nation Committee.

(Mr. Roshchin, USSR)

76. We may note in this connexion that the work of the Committee contributed to the conclusion in 1963 of the Moscow partial test-ban Treaty, (ENDC/100/Rev.1) to the reaching of agreement not to put objects carrying nuclear weapons into orbit (A/RES/1884(XVIII); ENDC/117) and to progress in solving some other questions relating to disarmament. The negotiations which have been conducted throughout these years in the Eighteen-Nation Committee have helped to draw the attention of all countries and of world public opinion to the problem of disarmament as one of the most important problems of international life.

77. At the same time it has to be noted with regret that the negotiations in the Committee have still not yielded the results that were expected of its work. Today, as at the start of the work of the Geneva Conference, we are still far from reaching agreement on general and complete disarmament and on many questions relating to partial measures of disarmament and the relaxation of international tension. In speaking of the reasons for the failure of the Committee to solve the problems before it, it is impossible to disregard the existing international situation, which has a direct effect and influence on the course of our negotiations. In this connexion it is necessary above all to point to the war unleashed by the United States in Viet-Nam. Likewise the solution of the problems of disarmament is not facilitated by the arms race policy that is being pursued by some of the Western Powers, and to which they give priority over the cause of disarmament.

78. The Soviet Union, true to its policy of defending peace and ensuring international security, has done and is continuing to do all that it can so that the negotiations in the Eighteen-Nation Committee may be fruitful and lead to the adoption of effective measures in the field of disarmament and the elimination of the threat of a nuclear war. As we enter the sixth year of negotiations on disarmament, we express the hope that the work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee will result in progress being made in fulfilling the tasks entrusted to it by the resolutions of the General Assembly and by the hopes of all mankind.

79. Mr. FOSTER (United States of America): As the Committee begins its sixth year the temptation is to list the accomplishments of the past rather than the challenges of the future. Our accomplishments, real as they may be, are small compared to our true potential now that a firm foundation for negotiations has been laid and forward movement has finally begun. So, after we pause briefly to review what has gone before, let us turn our attention to what can be achieved tomorrow.

(Mr. Foster, United States)

80. True it is that the Committee's long efforts have been rewarded with some success. Our deliberations have included the specific proposals which form the basis for three important forward steps to reduce the danger and the destruction of war. I refer, of course, to the limited test-ban Treaty (ENDC/100/Rev.1), the General Assembly resolution (A/RES/1884(XVIII); ENDC/117) against nuclear weapons in space which has now been incorporated into the Space Treaty (A/RES/2222(XXI)), and to the first "hot line" agreement (ENDC/97). True it is that we are succeeding in developing an integrated and expert attack on the complicated problems we face. This and the progress which has finally begun have convinced my Government that much more can be accomplished in the future. Despite the magnitude and the complexity of today's armaments, the intricate balances of power they have produced all round the world and the rivalries, suspicions and conflicts which still remain, our problems are capable of solution. But, if we have cause for satisfaction today, it should be what we can achieve tomorrow rather than what we did achieve yesterday.

81. What lies within our immediate grasp is a non-proliferation treaty, a goal for which we have all voted in General Assembly resolutions year after year since 1961. Pointing to the progress made towards such an agreement in 1966, President Johnson said recently "Our hopes are high that this long effort will soon be crowned with success". In an attempt to achieve this hope at the earliest possible date, I have been visiting the capitals of several nations allied to the United States. As the 1966 Eight-Nation Joint Memorandum on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons makes clear, a main obstacle to agreement on non-proliferation has been "mainly discussed between the major Powers and their allies" (ENDC/178, p.2).

82. In the discussions with our allies we have also sought to clarify a number of questions which all governments must consider when they examine a treaty of this nature -- as must freely-elected government officials directly responsible for the security and the progress of their countries. These are legitimate questions to which we believe there are reasonable answers. It is for this reason that I have been gone from Geneva and shall be going again this week. It is our intention to exert every effort we can on our side to expedite the tabling of a draft treaty so that discussion of a concrete text can begin here soon.

(Mr. Foster, United States)

83. On this fifth anniversary we are on the eve of reaching one of the most significant agreements on arms control in the twentieth century -- an agreement so heavily weighted in favour of humanity that we cannot ignore our responsibility to present it to the nations of the world for their signature. This would indeed be an anniversary gift of incalculable value.

84. If our hopes for success in this treaty are realized, our chances for further steps will clearly be enhanced. In the case of strategic nuclear carriers, for example, the United States and the Soviet Union have a unique opportunity for achieving a major arms limitation -- a limitation which would bring reassurance to the whole world. We are, to quote President Johnson again, "at a watershed in the dispiriting history of our arms competition. Decisions may be made on both sides which will trigger another upward spiral". We are determined to prevent a further build-up of this kind if we can. We are convinced that the achievement of a non-proliferation agreement will greatly assist towards that end by helping to reduce the tensions which make agreement on major weapons limitations so difficult. The steps we have already taken, and the one we are about to take, both lead us further down the road towards the safer, more peaceful world which we all seek.

85. Before concluding, I should like to join in the welcome to Ambassador U Maung Maung. It is good to see him here again with us.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué

"The Conference of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its 293rd plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the Chairmanship of H.E. Ambassador E.L.M. Burns, representative of Canada.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Canada, Brazil, the Soviet Union and the United States.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 16 March 1967, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 12.20 p.m.

